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0.1 Research Question and Explanation of Structure 
This thesis will examine the question: how do ethnically and politically 
marginalized groups form and sustain social movements to gain self-
governance in the face of authoritarian or autocratic rule?  This thesis will 
provide a historical and political analysis to examine two particular case 
studies while also utilizing various conceptions of civil society, social capital, 
and social movements. These case studies are an analysis of the Zapatista 
(EZLN) movement in Mexico and an examination of the evolution of the 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq.   
These examples offer two distinct movements, the first based on socio-
economics and the second based on politics, where both represent the banding 
together of diverse interests in order to secure self-governance for an 
oppressed ethnic minority group.  This thesis will examine their history, 
structure, and goals while also examining their place and relationships 
within civil society.  The Zapatista movement and the ascent of the KRG are 
not direct parallels, and while some comparisons will be made between the 
two case studies, they are distinct, interesting cases with some contextual 
overlap.   
After reviewing and analyzing these cases, this thesis will conclude 
with final thoughts where I reiterate that the EZLN operates with a deep, 
unshakable commitment to ideology while the KRG is ideologically flexible 
and operates in a pragmatic fashion to attain its goals.  Following these final 
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thoughts will be a brief examination of a third group, the Syrian-Kurdish 
YPG.  This group offers an interesting parallel to segments of both the 
Zapatistas and the KRG movements.  The YPG will be an ideal case study 
once the Syrian Civil War concludes, and this section will offer a framework 
for future analysis.  
I contend that the popular movements that have emerged and 
coalesced around the EZLN and the KRG should be studied and analyzed 
more extensively through the lens of civil society and social movements.  
Neither of these movements has received substantial analysis in 
philanthropic studies or ancillary disciplines, and the principle contribution 
of this thesis is demonstrating that the EZLN and KRG, distinct and 
different, are both important movements that deserve a deeper level of 
analysis.  Utilizing established and foundational literature, this thesis 
attempts to both answer the thesis question and provide a new starting point 
for future examination by scholars of philanthropy and social movements. 
0.2 Introduction and Civil Society Literature Review 
Social movements have been key to the study of philanthropy since Alexis 
de Tocqueville first described how the collective action of ordinary citizens is 
ideal for democracy and should be encouraged by both society and the 
government.  As this thesis utilizes civil society and social movement 
literature to frame both case studies, it is necessary to present and discuss 
existing literature.  This discussion of current literature serves to present 
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current theories and contentions within the discipline in order to place the 
EZLN and KRG within the field.  In both case studies, the literature initially 
presented here will be discussed and then later applied specifically to see if 
the examples of the EZLN and KRG should be included in future studies of 
social movement and civil society.   
While the work of numerous other foundational theorists, from Charles 
Tilly and his repertoires of contention to Mancur Olson’s rational choice 
theory, could be included in this review and analysis, this thesis endeavors to 
place these two cases studies within the literature broadly.  Deep discussion 
of foundational theory is certainly possible, but that is outside the scope of 
this work and could instead be reserved for future works where each case 
study can be dissected with a tighter focus that applies individual theory to 
each case study. 
Social movements are categorized as part of civil society – that “realm of 
organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially 
self-supporting, autonomous from government, and bound together by a legal 
order or set of shared rules” (Diamond, 1997, 6).  Diamond’s definition, while 
encompassing, leaves some necessary components of civil society unstated.  
While the modern idea of civil society that Diamond analyzes and critiques 
emerged in 18th-century Europe as a means for “citizens […] to define their 
place in society independent of the aristocratic state” (Anheier, 2005, 54), the 
roots of the concept reach back to antiquity. In The Politics, Aristotle 
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attempts to present the numerous forms of government that exist and 
highlight the superior nature of democracy over oligarchy or tyranny. As he 
presents his arguments, the philosopher provides a key component of civil 
society, that “[…] the natures of citizens are equal, and do not differ at all” 
(Everson, 1996, 27).  
This idea of the equality of all citizens persisted through the 
democratic movements that began in 18th-century Europe. The idea of 
equality was key to both the American and French Revolutions, where the 
idea that “[a]ll men are created equal” and “liberté, égalité, fraternité” 
became the rallying cries of popular government partisans. This equality is 
key to understanding civil society. Regardless of the critique or writing, 
scholars agree that “[c]ivil society is not a singular, monolithic, separate 
entity, but a sphere constituted in relation to both state and market, and 
indeed permeating both” (Anheier).  
This sphere has no fee or requirement for entrance; rather, anyone 
who enters has equal standing to one another.  Habermas is largely in 
concurrence with these definitions, offering that “[it] is composed of those 
more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and 
movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life 
sphere, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public 
sphere” (1996, 367). 
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 When these various understandings of civil society are taken in 
composite and combined with the Payton and Moody definition of 
philanthropy as “voluntary action for the public good,” social movements that 
follow Diamond’s guidelines for civil society are, by definition, part of the 
great Third Sector that is also described as the philanthropic sector (2008).  
Citizens who voluntarily engage in collective action and join social 
movements are thus practicing philanthropy.  They are also, as Tocqueville 
notes, promoting democratic norms and concepts in their private lives.  As 
individuals organize and participate in social movements, they learn about 
their social and political rights while also realizing through practice and 
interaction that, as Aristotle noted, they are entirely equal to their fellow 
citizens. 
 While social movements do not need to be democratic in nature, their 
horizontal structure and participatory nature inculcate democratic practices 
regardless of their intent.  This means that individuals or organizations 
wishing to promote democracy and democratic values can do so by supporting 
social movements of all kinds, either financially or through participation.  It 
is this participation that Tocqueville was so taken with when he visited the 
United States and subsequently encouraged in his writings. 
An alternative to this form of engaged and democratic social 
movement, however, is the national citizen group.   Like the participatory 
form of collective action, these organizations claim that they unite large 
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numbers of people around a common cause or interest that is typically 
political in nature; however, many national citizen groups are membership 
driven rather than participatory.  This means that this form of organization 
gathers membership dues from a national base of supporters who claim 
affiliation but do not often engage actively in mass-mobilization efforts, 
regular member meetings, or letter writing campaign, which are all common 
examples of participant driven social movements.  An American example of 
such a movement would be the Sierra Club. 
As Berry notes in The Rise of Citizen Groups, these forms of 
organization are popular in nations that have representative systems of 
government.  They will typically engage in advocacy work for the cause, i.e. 
lobbying politicians and bureaucrats to educate them on the cause or group 
they represent.  Berry explains that this is natural because “most governing 
is done by representatives who act for us rather than by participatory 
institutions.” (1999, 369)  
Thus, collective action mimics the political forms with which many are 
already familiar.  This form of collective action, however, is typically an 
alternative to participatory social movements only when a responsive 
government exists that typically values the citizenry equally.  In regions or 
nations that are still developing democratic traditions, membership based 
social movements might not be as effective as participatory social movements 
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that can better help to develop, teach, and inculcate democratic values (Verba 
et al. 1995). 
Social movements are an ideal way for citizens to demonstrate their 
beliefs and preferences to political leadership.  As Diamond explains “[a 
democratic] government must be held accountable to the people, and in which 
mechanisms must exist for making it responsive to their passions, 
preferences, and interests” (1997, 2). Social movements are one such 
mechanism that forces the government to be responsive.  This is especially 
true, according to Diamond, when elections are not adequate or not truly 
representative of the populaces’ preferences (3).   
In fact, Diamond argues that when there is a lack of democratic control 
for all or part of the population, “[o]nly the mass public can generate the 
political pressure and power necessary to bring about reform” (4). 
Furthermore, social movements are fundamental in the development of 
democracies as “[p]articipation in civil society (separate and apart from party 
politics) rises, and the civic quest to build democracy reaches new heights” 
(62).  
One issue that Diamond identifies, however, is that the interest of 
international observers can cause NGOs, and by extension social movements, 
to sputter and even fail if they develop an over-reliance on international 
funding and then funding priorities leave them behind, resulting in a loss of 
financial support (ibid).  Those that did not fail, however, were frequently 
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forced to adapt their mission in order to secure funding from international 
donors and foundations; the risk of this “adaptation diminishes the 
autonomy, shrinks the grassroots base, and dilutes the democratic zeal of the 
organization” (65). 
Jenkins and Halcli seek an answer to how international funders 
impact social movements, asking if “[social movement philanthropy] fuel[s] 
social change by strengthening social movements, or is it a cooptative force 
that weakens and blunts the impact of organization” (1999, 229).  As there 
are differing definitions on what makes a social movement, Jenkins and 
Halcli offer “a collective attempt to organize or represent the interests of a 
previously unorganized or politically excluded group” (230) as an operating 
definition for a social movement.  They further describe “social movement 
philanthropy” as reactive in nature (ibid) rather than proactive, meaning 
that funding comes in to support an existing social movement rather than 
providing seed money to encourage collective action.   
Further, they describe social movements as “the major spur to 
foundation patronage and that, due to a ‘radical-flank effect,’ this protest 
legitimizes moderate movement leaders, thus directing most of the money 
toward the less militant projects, thereby demobilizing grassroots protest” 
(243). On the other hand, Jenkins and Halcli argue that “[s]ocial movement 
philanthropy is also credited with providing critical resources for 
implementing social movement gains” (ibid). Therefore, philanthropic aid to 
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social movements can undermine them by coopting the message and intent of 
the collective action, or it can help to bolster a movement that requires 
resources to sustain its actions and further spread its message.  
Donors and powerful players in civil society will sometimes move to 
subvert collective action in an attempt to maintain their control or influence.  
Indeed, "it is a general rule of civil society that its strongest members get 
stronger. The weaker and poorer members are either unable to organize at 
all-or they form groups that reflect their weakness and poverty" (Walzer 
2002, p. 39).  When citizens do organize, Archon Fung argues that these 
“schools of democracy because they teach their members skills-how to 
organize themselves, run meetings, write letters, argue issues, and make 
speeches-that are necessary for all manner of political action” (2003, 520).    
Fung further argues that in poor areas, the citizenry often lacks the 
time or skills necessary to engage in collective action (527).  When 
associations and social movements are able to form in areas with 
exclusionary or undemocratic practices, however, they offer an alternative to 
politics that do not represent specific segments of the populations.  This, 
according to Fung, means that ethnic, indigenous, and marginalized 
populations who resist central political control will substitute their own 
autonomous, democratic forms of governance (534). While social movements 
might inculcate democratic practices in functioning democracies, “[i]n 
tyrannical contexts […] resistance may be far more urgent than the 
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development of civic virtues such as toleration and respect for the rule of law 
(536). 
Wealthy patrons and citizens participating in mobilization efforts often 
have competing visions for what a social movement should look like or stand 
for, and members of each group will struggle to define the mission and future 
of the group.  Benford and Snow define this struggle within the context of 
social movements as collective action framing, where “movement actors are 
viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and 
maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or 
observers” (2000, 613).  Rather than being defined in an organic, egalitarian 
way, Benford and Snow contend that the process of collective action framing 
is deliberate and a source of struggle and contention where those opposed to 
the movement will work to reframe the struggle and adherents will both 
proactively and reactively fight to shed reframing attempts that put the 
movement in a negative light. 
In their discussion of collective action framing, Benford and Snow 
define three “core framing tasks” that movement actors can utilize to build 
consensus and induce passive observers to join in an active way (615).  The 
first of these tasks, diagnostic framing, seeks to define and contextualize the 
social problem that the movement is working for or against.  Benford and 
Snow offer injustice frames as a primary example of diagnostic framing, 
where a social movement seeks to demonstrate that an injustice is being 
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perpetrated and must be confronted by “collective noncompliance, protest, 
and/or rebellion-generated and adopted by those who come to define the 
actions of an authority as unjust” (ibid). 
The second of the core framing tasks, prognostic framing, “addresses 
the Leninesque question of what is to be done, as well as the problems of 
consensus and action mobilization” (616). Here the social movement actors 
must identify and agree upon a set of solutions that they will put forward to 
constituents and potential supporters in order to rectify the social issue that 
a movement has formed to address.  In order to maintain credibility, the 
prognostic framing must be realistic and acceptable when presented to 
potential supporters; opponents of a social movement will often attack these 
prognoses, and movement actors must be nimble in their development and 
defense of the strategies and solutions that they advocate for by continually 
developing and defining their efforts in concrete ways (617). 
The last of the core framing tasks, motivational framing, serves to 
create a “rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action, including 
the construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive” (ibid).  Benford and 
Snow contend that the way in which activists discuss can add a sense of 
urgency that can induce those sympathetic to a social movement to take 
increasingly strong action or contribute in more meaningful ways when the 
vocabulary used demonstrates the urgency of action as “socially constructed 
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vocabularies provide[s] adherents with compelling accounts for engaging in 
collective action and for sustaining their participation” (ibid). 
A fundamental part of civil society and social movements is social 
capital and its creation between individuals and groups.  A simple, yet 
accurate, definition says, “social capital refers to the norms and networks 
that enable people to act collectively” (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, 3). 
Within social capital, there are two main forms described as bonding and 
bridging social capital.  Bonding social capital can be “described as connecting 
people who are like one another in important respects while bridging 
networks link people who are unlike one another” (Geyes and Murdoch, 2010, 
524).   
Further, bridging social capital can occur within a group, which is 
called internal bridging, or it can occur between groups, which is called 
external bridging.  Social capital is important vis-à-vis social movements 
because there must be some sort of connection that unites the people who are 
organizing in collective action.  Further, it is also important for social 
movements to be made up of different groups, whether these differences are 
ethnic, religious, or income based, in order to appeal to a larger audience and 
gain legitimacy (Smith, 1998).   
There is a difference of opinion, however, regarding whether social 
movements allow for social capital of any kind to be generated.  According to 
Putnam, social movements should be excluded entirely from civil society, as 
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they often do not give room for participants to engage in the interpersonal 
relationship building that is critical to forming social capital (70).  On the 
other hand, Foley and Edwards argue that this narrow conception of social 
movements do not take the structure of individual movements; instead, 
Putnam focuses on large, national membership organizations and ignores the 
divergent forms of collective action represented by grassroots social 
movements (1996).   
Furthermore, Smith argues that social movements can aid in creating 
transnational social capital, especially now that technology allows for an 
easier transmission of news and ideas.  This is an example of bridging social 
capital, though depending on the sources of the connections, philanthropists 
who are engaging with social movements might seek to coopt the mission or 
the goals of the movement.   
In addition to strengthening connections between individuals and 
groups of people, Fukuyama argues that there is an important economic 
component to building social capital.  He argues that the formation of social 
capital will “reduce the transaction costs associated with formal co-ordination 
mechanisms like contracts, hierarchies, bureaucratic rules, and the like” 
(2001, 10).  Fukuyama, argues this is important because there is no way for 
every eventuality in a business contract to be explicitly stated; thus, the 
formation of norms and networks between individuals or groups results in 
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less of a need for these eventualities to be explicitly stated or inspected 
during a transaction (ibid).   
Fukuyama further points out that social capital in developing 
countries is often the result of globalization.  While globalization can bring 
new ideas to a developing nation, Fukuyama also contends that it can be a 
destabilizing force in that it “injures indigenous cultures and threatens long-
standing traditions” (19).  Fukuyama states, however, that this is balanced 
by the ability of organizers and revolutionaries to export their ideas to these 
developing areas (ibid). 
 As the impulse for democracy and personal freedoms increases in 
developing nations and politically marginalized areas, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi 
argues that collective action can control corruption.  She argues that political 
contests are not a sufficient mechanism to control for fighting authoritarian 
regimes; rather, social movements can counterbalance these autocratic forms 
of government (2013, 102).   
Mungiu-Pippidi asserts that a “virtuous combination of [values, social 
capital, civil society, and civic culture] enables [collective action] to overcome 
competing tendencies toward violence, cronyism, and social hierarchy and to 
generate normative constraints that empower ethical universalism” (104).  
Mungiu-Pippidi also finds that states that have transitioned from 
authoritarian rule to democracy or self-governance in recent history began as 
grassroots social movements with only loose ties; however, they matured over 
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time as these bonds were strengthened, and the movements succeeded in 
becoming a democratic institution (110). 
Finally, Debra Minkoff argues that many scholars of civil society 
overlook the importance of social movements (1997, 606).  Rather, Minkoff 
argues that social movements “play a critical role in civil society and the 
production of social capital by providing an infrastructure for collective 
action, facilitating the development of mediated collective identities that link 
otherwise marginalized members of society, and shaping public discourse and 
debate” (ibid).   
As previously discussed, social movements are an ideal way for 
marginalized groups to engage in collective action, construct social capital 
between individual participants and associated groups, and form a collective 
identity.  Often, a diverse coalition of interests that have similar goals and 
interests coalesce to form a movement. But Minkoff cautions “the diffuse 
nature of such social ties limits available social capital and organizational 
capacities, consequently constraining political effectiveness” (607).  This 
belies the difficulty of maintaining a successful social movement in the face of 
varied coalition interests and emphasizes the importance of generating 
bridging social capital between the various participant groups and their 
members. 
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0.3 Zapatista Case Study Literature Review 
Although the case study covering the Zapatista movement will be 
grounded and in part analyzed based on the previously discussed literature 
that defines and discusses civil society, social capital, and social movements, 
this thesis will also utilize a number of books, articles, and primary source 
documents that were released by or discuss the EZLN.   
Although the Zapatistas represent a relatively small social movement 
and are essentially confined geographically to a single, remote state in 
Mexico, there have been a number of insightful works centered on the 
movement and its goals.  These analyses form an important and diverse 
collection of literature that this thesis will draw on extensively.  Another key 
source of information for this case study is the EZLN itself.  Each year, 
dozens of Zapatista communiqués are released to the public and offer a 
unique insight into the stated goals, ideology, and structure of the movement.  
These announcements will be utilized. 
Gilbreth and Otero argue that the Zapatista movement emerged at a 
pivotal moment in modern Mexican history and fundamentally altered the 
trajectory of the country (2001).  Just as the ruling Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) celebrated the implementation of the single 
largest neo-liberal trade agreement, NAFTA, they were confronted with a 
wave of anger and dissatisfaction.  This opposition manifested itself in the 
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Zapatista National Liberation Army, more widely known as the Zapatista 
movement or the EZLN.   
Composed of “primarily Mayan peasants, both members and 
sympathizers of the [EZLN], and their national and international 
supporters,” (7) this social movement erupted onto the international scene on 
January 1, 1994 with a dozen days of intense fighting before a ceasefire was 
called.  Gilbreth and Otero contend that, unlike previous uprisings, this was 
not a political party masquerading as a movement.  They differentiate the 
two, arguing that “[t]he key difference is that political parties have focused 
their efforts on reforming political society from within while the EZLN has 
interpellated civil society to push for democratization from the bottom up” 
(ibid). 
In his examination of the formation of social capital in Mexico, 
Jonathon Fox contends that the EZLN is a true grassroots social movement 
that formed social capital without the traditional assistance of external allies.  
Fox states that the authoritarian policies of the PRI assured the success of 
the Zapatistas because they had already suppressed the moderate voices that 
were pushing for incremental change; thus, an armed, grassroots social 
movement seemed to be the only remaining option (1996, 1097).  Far from 
being spontaneous, however, this movement had simply been organized at 
the local level without the input or knowledge of national reformist and 
opposition groups, relying instead on local communication and engagement. 
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Indeed, “[f]or more than a year, many dozens, probably hundreds of 
villages debated whether to take up arms in open assemblies (though they 
debated in their own languages, and were therefore unintelligible to most 
government officials)” (ibid).  Fox argues that the Zapatistas built upon 
already existing tribal and religious connections to form their own “dense web 
of horizontal associations” (ibid).  Their success at forming these connections 
is easily observed by the fact that not only have they succeeded and survived 
as a movement, but not a single member of any community that debated 
joining the movement ever informed to the government.  Even before the 
movement officially emerged, they had succeeded in creating social capital 
among the citizenry of Chiapas. 
While Fox is interested primarily in the internal connections that 
allowed the EZLN to gain and retain widespread support through the 
formation of social capital, Olesen focuses on how the movement created and 
leveraged similar connections on an international scale.  Although the 
Zapatistas are opposed to neo-liberal economic policies that have followed 
globalization, the movement has proved itself adroit at using the “the 
Internet, or computer mediated communication, in the formation of the 
transnational Zapatista solidarity network” (2005, 181 
While the EZLN has released hundreds of communiqués in the last 22 
years, this thesis will focus on ones relating to civil society, democratization, 
and foreign assistance.  Enlace Zapatista posts these communiqués in their 
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original Spanish and with translations whenever they are released to the 
public; however, the archived posts from the early days of the movement are 
only in Spanish.  Thus, this thesis will also rely on archives of translations 
collected by a member of the solidarity network (located at 
http://www.struggle.ws/mexico/ezlnco.html); further, quality translations 
must be utilized, as my own Spanish is now relatively basic and nowhere 
near fluent.   
“The First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle” served as a 
“declaration of war” and was released on January 1st, 1994 when the 
movement first struck at the government.  Another communiqué, entitled 
“[t]he only choice is democracy or authoritarianism” was released a year and 
a half later, in July of 1995, and it restated the movement’s arguments for 
rejecting the rule of the PRI and local strongmen and embracing democratic 
self-governance.  Finally, “Chiapas: The Thirteenth Stele” was released in 
July of 2003, and it was part of a series of changes and reforms instituted by 
EZLN leadership.  This communiqué explained how and why the EZLN 
would restrict foreign charity coming into Chiapas, arguably limiting civil 
society in order to preserve the movement. 
0.4 Kurdish Regional Government Case Study Literature Review 
While the Zapatista movement has never pushed for secession or 
statehood, choosing instead to focus on achieving democratic reforms and 
autonomy, the Kurds in Iraq have long desired a nation of their own.  For 
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decades, this ethnic group and its political leaders have slowly maneuvered 
the region from de facto autonomy based on demographics to de jure 
autonomy guaranteed under the Iraqi constitution.  Now, the Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG) is poised to hold a referendum to declare 
independence.  This move is the culmination of decades of networking, 
politicking, and pragmatic alliances, and it is likely that there will soon be an 
independent Kurdistan in what is now the Kurdish region of northern Iraq.  
This case study will examine how a small, marginalized movement that was 
ejected from Iran after a flirtation with an autonomous republic grew into a 
political government with international respect and support.   
In their work The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, B. O’Leary, McGarry, 
and Salih provide a historical analysis of the various iterations of Kurdistan 
that have come and gone since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.  Although 
the Kurds in northern Iraq have at some point been betrayed by virtually 
every major nation, from Iran to the United States, they currently enjoy a 
period of heretofore-unknown political power and support, both domestically 
and internationally (2005, 7).  Despite, or perhaps because of, the ascendency 
and threat of insurgent, Islamist terror groups, the KRG has consolidated 
and built upon previous international support to argue that they should be 
allowed to secede from Iraq in a bid for independence. 
Hassanpour, meanwhile, offers a historical analysis of Kurds in each of 
their major enclaves and explains why a Greater Kurdistan that extends 
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throughout the north-central portion of the Middle East would be untenable.  
He argues that despite ethnic homogeneity, the political and social 
differences between various Kurdish factions are too great to overcome 
(1994).  These differences, combined with a lack of will on the part of Turkey, 
Syria, and Iran to cede large portions of their land and citizenry, makes the 
goal of a Greater Kurdistan even more untenable.   
This, however, does not preclude the formation of an independent Iraqi 
Kurdistan.  While the two dominant parties in Kurdish politics, the Kurdish 
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have 
gone so far as to fight a civil war against each other, they are now unified in a 
small-scale revival of the Kurdish nationalist movement.  Although there is 
often a risk that their alliance could fall apart, they both enjoy unprecedented 
positions of power in the region. 
With one of the founders of the PUK, Fuad Masum, holding the Iraqi 
presidency and Masoud Barzani of the KDP serving as president of the KRG, 
a careful political approach could result in a peaceful transition to 
independence.  As each group has sought rapprochement with longtime 
regional adversary Turkey, it seems more likely that the important regional 
governments will agree to an independent Iraqi Kurdistan (Park, 2014).  
There is speculation, however, that these bids for independence are not 
genuine; rather, it is possible that they are merely an attempt to gain 
increased power and position before pushing for greater autonomy.  C. 
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O’Leary contends that the KRG is better served consolidating their recent 
successes and gains while remaining a part of Iraq, perhaps as a federal 
district with great autonomy and, essentially, self-rule.  She argues, 
“federalism can help to ensure the unity and stability of a post-Saddam 
Hussein Iraq, thereby providing a climate for democratization and civil 
society building” (2002, 24).  While these observations were likely true in 
2002, the political situation of the KRG has improved to such a degree that 
the autonomy currently enjoyed by Iraqi Kurds might well seem insufficient. 
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1.0 The Zapatista Case: Background 
On January 1, 1994, the Mexican government celebrated the successful 
passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  To the 
Mexican political elites, this represented their entrance into the world’s 
economic elite.  The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which had ruled 
continuously for nearly 70 years, touted this new trade agreement as one of 
their great successes; however, the passage of NAFTA provided a springboard 
for discontent to emerge, and the guerillas of the Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation (EZLN) seized this opportunity.   
On the same day that NAFTA went into effect, thousands of poorly 
armed peasant fighters emerged from the Lacandon Jungle in the 
southernmost Mexican state, Chiapas.  With a clear message, articulated by 
the Zapatista’s mestizo spokesman Subcomandante Marcos, it was impossible 
to ignore the sudden challenge to central authority as the rebels seized 
territory and clashed with the Mexican security apparatus.  From the start, 
this was an indigenous peasant revolt, and “the uprising forcefully exposed 
the conditions of poverty and marginalization under which much of Mexico's 
indigenous population lived, the humiliation and discrimination they 
suffered, and the political exclusion which kept them from enjoying full 
citizenship” (van der Haar, 2004, 99).   
Unprepared for the coordinated, though poorly supplied onslaught, the 
Mexican government responded with a show of force that was soon covered by 
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Western media, leading to international outrage.   Internally, the Zapatista 
movement also began to gain support from segments of the Mexican 
population, including both intellectuals sympathetic to the plight of the 
indigenous and poor farmers from around the country.  These outside allies of 
the movement demonstrated their support when “more than 100,000 people 
gathered in Mexico City protesting against the attempted annihilation of the 
rebels” (Mentinis, 2006, 9). 
1.1 Motivations and Strategies 
The Zapatista movement started with economic and political 
motivations.  NAFTA, the EZLN and their allies argued, would make already 
poverty stricken regions even poorer.  Cheap agricultural products, like corn, 
could now be imported from the United States without the protective tariffs 
to protect the campesinos, or peasant farmers, from losing their only source of 
income.  In addition to the dramatic reductions to protective tariffs that 
NAFTA demanded, President Salinas instituted land reforms in 1992 that 
“proposed fundamental changed to the ejidal sector in matters of land 
redistribution, land tenure, economic relations, state relations, subsidy 
reduction, and programs targeted to support small farmers” (Stanford, 1994, 
102).  These changes to land rights amounted to massive privatization of 
previously public land that peasant farmers had long relied on for an income.  
Thus, the movement demanded that the Mexican government redistribute 
land to the peasantry, a demand supported by Article 27 of the Mexican 
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constitution, which guaranteed agrarian reforms and a redistribution of land 
back to the indigenous population (Teresa, 2004, 31).   
In addition to arguing that NAFTA would decimate the livelihood of 
numerous indigenous and poor rural Mexicans, the Zapatista movement was 
also predicated on the belief that the PRI and even rival opposition parties 
had excluded indigenous populations from the political process.  The wealthy 
landowners and businessmen in Mexico City would benefit from NAFTA and 
thus support its passage, but the rural poor and indigenous populations were 
excluded from the decision making process (Mentinis).  As the indigenous 
populations had long been disenfranchised and neglected, both economically 
and politically, the Zapatista argument was accepted by many, allowing them 
to create an armed wing of several thousand insurgents that emerged as soon 
as NAFTA came into effect. 
Quick to capitalize off the media attention and begin airing grievances, 
the EZLN leadership agreed to a ceasefire thirteen days after the start of 
hostilities.  The influential bishop of the San Cristobal de las Casas diocese, 
Samuel Ruiz, organized this temporary abatement of hostilities, as he was a 
pacifist with sympathy for the Zapatista movement’s goals (Preston, 2011).   
Although the EZLN had initially hoped to export their revolution 
beyond the state of Chiapas, this was untenable, and the leadership quickly 
decided to focus their efforts on Chiapas itself.  The Mexican government 
knew nothing of the rebellion, which had been in the works for years, and 
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they assumed that this was a movement arranged by outside agitation.  The 
government’s evidence for the Zapatistas being an external group was based 
on the identity of the EZLN spokesman Marcos, who was a mestizo rather 
than a member of an indigenous group.  They did not imagine that the 
movement’s utilization of Marcos as a mouthpiece was a deliberate move to 
attract more external attention, and the government instead speculated that 
the Zapatistas were really Guatemalan fighters (Doyle, 2004). 
1.2 Origins of Support and the Creation of Networks 
As the Mexican government did not properly understand the makeup 
and identity of the forces arrayed against them, they were unable to 
adequately respond.  After the ceasefire was declared, Mexican authorities 
believed they could bribe local indigenous groups and villages away from the 
movement.  They assumed that the peasant support for the Zapatistas was 
tepid and a matter of convenience and good propaganda.  These assumptions, 
however, were generally incorrect.  The EZLN was forged through consensus 
and negotiation between villages, local leaders, and the Zapatista leadership.  
While the Mexican government still employed a corrupt and paternalistic 
hierarchy in states with large indigenous populations, civilians in Chiapas 
organized themselves into town councils where everyone had a right to speak 
and decisions were made through negotiation and consensus (Barmeyer).   
The EZLN utilized these councils to forge agreements of both direct 
support and passive alignment to create a broad network of internal 
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supporters.  For years the councils met and debated, allowing individuals to 
offer their input.  This was an exercise in true democracy, and it inspired the 
EZLN to adopt the spread of this form of governance into their mission.  
Further, the EZLN utilized networks created by Liberation Theology clergy 
to gain additional support for the movement and spread their ideology beyond 
remote, jungle villages.  The Zapatistas did not win the support of every 
village that they approached within Chiapas; however, they were able to form 
a large coalition of internal support and met little active resistance, even 
among those they failed to convince (Olesen). 
This success in forging a coalition of diverse interests is especially of 
note given the ethnic and cultural diversity that exists in Chiapas.  A 
significant number of mestizo and Spanish ranchers had settled in Chiapas 
during the nineteenth century and established large estates for agricultural 
and livestock.  This resulted in many mestizos in Chiapas being relatively 
wealthy compared to the many indigenous groups that already occupied the 
region.  A part of the former Mayan Empire, Chiapas retains some of the 
highest levels of indigenous population in all of Mexico, with the vast 
majority of districts composed of at least half indigenous and many reaching 
ninety percent indigenous.  Within Chiapas, six major ethnic groups 
constitute the majority of indigenous citizens: the Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Tojolabal, 
Zoque, Chol, and Maam (Mentinis).  All of these groups have significant 
representation within the Zapatista movement and are distributed 
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throughout Chiapas, with large concentrations in the central highlands, 
throughout the northwest of the state, and along the Guatemalan border 
(Scmal, 2004).  These are all areas where the Zapatista movement enjoys 
strong levels of local support. 
While mestizaje (miscegenation) resulted in the mixing of indigenous 
and Spanish throughout Mexico, Chiapas was remote and undeveloped 
enough that large segments of the population remain “pure indigenous” 
despite official government efforts (ibid).  While many in Chiapas have 
converted to the Catholic faith, the various indigenous groups have also been 
able to retain many of their own distinct customs and traditions.  It also 
means that mestizos are less common in Chiapas than many other states in 
Mexico (ibid).  While the wealthy mestizo ranchers and landholders who were 
able to retain land despite expropriation are opposed to the Zapatista 
movement, many live in the cities and lands outside EZLN control or 
influence; meanwhile, the mestizos living within Zapatista territories have a 
shared struggle with the movement as they are also often poor agricultural 
workers (Mentinis).  
With this support, the EZLN was able to survive the government’s 
brutal counterattack, lasting long enough to agree to a ceasefire.  
Immediately, the Zapatistas stated that they were willing to find a political 
compromise rather than engage in an insurgency.  As the Catholic Church 
had brokered the ceasefire and the international community was focused on 
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the uprising, the Mexican government agreed to enter into peace talks with 
the goal of creating a political solution.  The Zapatistas were clear that their 
priority was the institution of democratic reforms rather than an overthrow 
of the state.   
1.3 Articulating Demands and Radical Democracy 
The Zapatista’s Second Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle declared 
that “[c]ivil society assumed the duty of preserving our country. It showed its 
disapproval of the massacre and it obliged us to dialogue with the 
government” (EZLN, 1994).  In this same communiqué, the Zapatistas renew 
their adherence to the ceasefire and declare that the EZLN’s goal is to allow 
the formation and reinforcement of civil society in order to expedite the 
transition to democracy.  Further, the EZLN demands participatory 
democracy, which will allow indigenous and poor, rural Mexicans to have a 
voice in the political system.  They declare that “[t]he problem of power is not 
a question of who rules, but of who exercises power. If it is exercised by a 
majority of the people, the political parties will be obligated to put their 
proposals forward to the people instead of merely relating to each other” 
(ibid). 
Of note, however, is the Zapatista commitment to radical democracy 
rather than liberal democracy.  The EZLN espouse the philosophy that 
representatives should ‘rule by obeying,’ in that constituents will detail their 
wishes and desires through public forums, and representatives will be totally 
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responsive to these demands.  The Zapatistas treat each member of the 
community as a rational actor with total equality, whether they are 
indigenous or mestizo, rich or poor, farmer or scholar (Olesen).  Decisions are 
made by consensus both within the EZLN leadership and the areas they 
control, an approach that indicates the movement’s adherence to radical 
democracy rather than classic democracy (ibid). 
The EZLN broadcasted these messages throughout Mexico and the 
world by utilizing the newly popular Internet to organize networks of support 
beyond their territory in Chiapas.  Communiqués were now distributed 
internationally instantaneously the day they were released, and activists 
around the world translated and shared these messages.  The distribution of 
these materials was planned and premeditated; however, the Zapatistas 
relied on friends and colleagues to get the word out.  After all, the EZLN was 
largely confined to the Lacandon Jungle by the Mexican military after 1995 
when they broke the conditions of the ceasefire and forced the movement to 
abandon numerous villages that they had controlled since the start of the 
movement (Cleaver, 1998).  
After surviving the months long siege, the EZLN and the Mexican 
government’s Commission of Concordia and Pacification (COCOPA) began a 
round of talks aimed at finding a political solution.  These accords were 
forged in the town of San Andres de la Larrainzar, and they were thus called 
the San Andres Accords.  Signed on February 16, 1996, the accords 
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“establish[ed] recognition of a number of indigenous rights in the fields of, 
among others, forms of social and political organization, the election of local 
authorities, the administration of justice, management of resources, land 
tenure and cultural development, and they commit the Mexican government 
to promoting these rights” (van der Haar, 100).   
These agreements attracted wide support from moderates as well as 
indigenous groups, and it appeared as though they would solve the crises.  
The accords promised autonomy for indigenous groups, and they 
memorialized a commitment to self-rule and democracy as a political 
compromise.  The document was translated into multiple native languages 
and distributed widely; however, the EZLN soon realized that the PRI was 
not interested in investing local communities with political power.  As the 
EZLN withdrew from the process, COCOPA offered a proposal to enshrine 
many of the agreements into the constitution.  The EZLN agreed to this, but 
President Zedillo delayed passage for years while simultaneously sending 
additional military resources to Chiapas in the hope that he could crush the 
uprising completely without political compromise (ibid). 
Throughout this process, the Zapatista networks of support remained 
largely intact.  International supporters continued to post communiqués 
online and protest Mexican oppression in front of embassies and consulates, 
often attracting Western media attention (Olesen).  Locally, relatively few 
villages defected from the cause.  They were often unable to provide the 
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EZLN with material or political support, but they did not turn on the 
movement or reveal the identities of its leadership.  The social capital that 
the Zapatistas had built up during the planning of the revolt remained 
relatively constant, demonstrating that the promise of civil society was more 
than a theoretical commitment.    
1.4 Implementing Democratic Self-Governance In The Face of 
Oppression 
These ties were further strengthened as the Zapatista leadership 
implemented their vision of democratic self-governance.  Building off the 
existing models of participatory democracy, “formed among the Zapatista 
civilian population to organize their mobilization and resistance, and […] this 
civil infrastructure was gradually formalized and consolidated as the conflict 
in Chiapas drew on” (van der Haar, 102). These EZLN organized autonomous 
municipalities within Chiapas were known locally as Municipios Autonomos y 
Rebeldes Zapatistas (MAREZ), and they were planned and implemented 
outside of the public eye (ibid).   
Although the formation and implementation of these autonomous 
municipalities was discussed from the beginning of the movement, they only 
became a focus of the Zapatista movement following the San Andres accords.  
Moving quickly, the EZLN organized 38 of these MAREZ within two years, 
though they were prevalent only in central and eastern Chiapas, where the 
Zapatistas enjoyed considerable support (ibid).  Although autonomy had been 
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discussed by EZLN leadership before their public emergence in 1994, “[t]he 
Accords not only established the legitimacy of the indigenous claim to 
autonomy, but also provided the Zapatistas with a powerful justification to 
proceed with such implementation themselves” (103). 
As the EZLN worked to consolidate gain, however, they continually 
were met with significant violence.  Indeed, a PRI affiliated band of 
paramilitaries committed one of the worst atrocities of the conflict when they 
attacked the village Acteal on December 22, 1997.  This community was 
composed of Tzotzil who supported the goals of the Zapatistas.  The Tzotzil, 
however, were pacifists and refused to engage in an armed struggle; thus, the 
village’s men withdrew when they heard news of an impending attack in 
order to minimize the chances of a violent clash.  Instead of avoiding a fight, 
however, they experienced a brutal massacre that left 45 civilians, mostly 
women and children, dead (Mentinis, 20).   
Although these attacks continued, neither the military nor police 
intervened.  Refusing to do more than condemn the attacks, the government 
furthered their attempts to discredit the movement and remove human rights 
observers simultaneously.  Utilizing their connections in the media, the PRI 
characterized the EZLN as a foreigner controlled group that had tricked a 
small number of indigenous Mexicans into joining their insurrection.  
Further, the Mexican government deported over a hundred citizen human 
rights observers from Europe and the United States and often banned them 
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from entering Mexico for up to a decade; further, the PRI added additional 
restrictions to who could receive humanitarian visas (22).   
The Mexican government believed that this would give them a freer 
hand to suppress the Zapatista movement, and the PRI ramped up their 
campaign of attrition by cutting crucial social services to areas that the 
EZLN controlled or had public sympathy.  This effort, however, arguably 
strengthened the Zapatista movement and their push for autonomy.  
Ignoring the government’s obstructionist tone and unwillingness to 
compromise, EZLN redoubled their push for autonomous municipalities by 
forming functioning local governments that replaced the numerous social 
services that the PRI had eliminated (van der Haar, 103).  
Rather than form these political systems themselves, the EZLN 
supported local elections that allowed any citizen within a district to serve on 
a municipal, autonomous council (ibid).  This allowed both indigenous and 
mestizo representation, depending on local demographics and candidate 
qualifications; further, these diverse councils contradicted common criticisms 
of the movement that either argued it was controlled by outside agitators and 
not the indigenous, and that the movement was strictly indigenous and 
excluded the mestizo farmers.  And while federal authority still exist within 
Chiapas, “[t]he autonomous municipalities operate parallel to the existing 
municipalities” (ibid). 
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The movement, however, has never been able to provide all of these 
services themselves; the EZLN leadership was often confined to the 
rainforest while the autonomous municipalities worked to introduce vital 
social services.  Instead, civil society, which the Zapatistas always supported, 
has provided many of the key resources that the citizens living in 
autonomous municipalities require (Barmeyer).  Numerous NGOs have 
supported the movement, both financially and materially, throughout the 
past two decades.  Some groups organize volunteer labor that helps in 
construction, education, or medical care while others send aid shipments 
through local agents. 
As domestic and foreign NGOs donated to the movement, it caused 
unintended problems that the Zapatistas were forced to address nimbly and 
sometimes authoritatively.  Due to the structure of the autonomous 
communities, each operated in consultation with EZLN leadership; however, 
they were not answerable to the movement.  Numerous autonomous 
municipalities sought to fully utilize civil society to provided needed services, 
and they quickly made as many contacts in and charitable appeals to NGOs 
as they could.  Due to ability and location, this created an imbalance in the 
distribution of resources throughout Chiapas, creating social friction between 
municipalities that had long enjoyed strong levels of bridging social capital 
(Barmeyer). 
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The EZLN observed this emerging inequality, but they did nothing for 
several years.  The PRI had finally been defeated in the polls; however, 
Vincente Fox was not much of an improvement for the Zapatistas.  The 
government’s campaign of violence and suppression, however, abated to a 
degree due to disinterest on the part of Fox and constant pressure from 
international supporters of the EZLN.  Fox was a free market politician who 
desired greater economic relations with the West, and it was clear that overt 
and harsh oppression of the EZLN would cost Mexico business with pro 
human rights nations (Olesen). 
1.5 Reorganizing the Movement and New Approaches 
This abatement in violence gave the EZLN leadership an opportunity 
to emerge from the Lacandon Jungle and engage more directly with the 
autonomous municipalities.  The Zapatista movement “reappeared, and 
forcefully, in August 2003, when the [EZLN] leadership announced a number 
of changes in the organization of the autonomous governance structures and 
thereby re-opened the debate on indigenous autonomy 'without approval'” 
(van der Haar, 104).  
Chief among these changes was a new policy that restricted the role of 
NGOs operating within Chiapas.  Promulgated in a document entitled The 
Thirteenth Stele, Part Two: A Death, this communiqué was published as a 
response to an increasingly piecemeal, inconsistent, and divisive NGO 
landscape.  In the document, three main objections to how civil society 
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operates within Chiapas are listed, namely the prevalence of the Cinderella 
Syndrome, NGOs and funders starting unnecessary projects that harm the 
community, and uneven levels of economic assistance (irlandesa, 2003).  
When describing the issue of Cinderella Syndrome, The Thirteenth 
Stele includes an anecdote where the writer (likely Subcomandante Marcos) 
describes an aid organization sending “a pink stiletto heel, imported, size 6 ½ 
...without its mate.” The author does not dismiss the intent of the 
organization that sent the aid, however, stating that “[t]hese [are] good 
people who, sincerely, send us a pink stiletto heel, size 6 ½, imported, without 
its mate...thinking that, poor as we are, we'll accept anything, charity and 
alms. How can we tell all those good people that no, we no longer want to 
continue living Mexico's shame” (ibid).  Thus, there are both practical and 
political considerations for the EZLN accepting NGO support.  
Further, part of the Mexican government’s less belligerent strategy for 
defeating the Zapatista insurgency was through regional improvement 
projects that focused on economic improvements. The EZLN dismisses these 
efforts declaring, “if the Zapatista communities wanted, they could have the 
best standard of living in Latin America. Imagine how much the government 
would be willing to invest in order to secure our surrender […] while the 
country fell apart in their hands” (idid). This might be somewhat 
disingenuous, after all the Zapatista movement has consistently rejected the 
use of economic status as a way to measure the success of a community; 
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however, the Zapatista movement has always been economically and 
politically motivated. Nevertheless, the EZLN started to focus increasingly on 
bringing substantive improvements to educational opportunities, access to 
medical services, and agricultural improvements to combat malnutrition.  
These were the chief issues that surrounded the initial petitions sent 
to the central government from the start of the Zapatista’s resistance, and 
the EZLN has been serious about addressing them rather than simply using 
the problems as propaganda tools.  This is especially true now that the 
movement has parallel structure of governance within the state. And while 
the EZLN does not trust the government or many foreign NGOs to operate 
within the region, there are a few organizations that the Zapatistas consider 
to be legitimate partners.  One such partner is the United States-based NGO 
named Schools for Chiapas, which will serve as the case study for EZLN-civil 
society interactions in this thesis. 
1.6 Examining an EZLN Partner From San Diego 
 Schools for Chiapas was officially founded in 1996 after the founder 
and president of the organization, Peter Brown, and some of his fellow 
advocates were invited by Subcomandante Marcos to observe initial meetings 
between the Zapatistas and Mexican civil society organizations. Brown is an 
American educator and activist, and he has been a longtime supporter of the 
Zapatista movement and its initiatives. Brown was one of the many civil 
society actors deported from Mexico and banned from returning by the PRI as 
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a result of his work. This forced him to return to his local San Diego to 
organize and support further efforts from abroad. It is likely that his ejection 
from the country only added to his reputation among the EZLN, as the group 
is suspicious of outsiders who have not demonstrated their commitment to 
the movement (Barmeyer). Brown’s work was recognized when he was 
bestowed with the NEA's Applegate-Dorros Peace and International 
Understanding Award in 2013. 
As Schools for Chiapas formalized its activities, the group moved closer 
and closer to the EZLN with its stated raison d’etre “focused on financially 
supporting Zapatista educational projects and other initiatives” 
(Organizational History, 2014).  This is an NGO with a single, narrow area of 
interest.  It is classified as an international development organization; 
however, Schools for Chiapas is, in reality, a member of the larger solidarity 
network that supports the Zapatista movement materially and spiritually.   
This reality demonstrates the ability of the EZLN and their local 
partners to create strong bridging social capital beyond the state of Chiapas 
and Mexico.  Peter Brown is totally devoted to the Zapatista movement, 
spending most of his time fundraising for the movement and educating 
Western audiences on the EZLN’s politics and projects.  At the same time, 
Schools for Chiapas expands the reach of bridging social capital by organizing 
volunteer opportunities for partners and those sympathetic to the Zapatista 
movement.  These volunteers help to build new school buildings, teach 
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courses in subjects like English language, and experience the reality of those 
living in Zapatista areas of Chiapas.  Additionally, volunteers receive an 
extensive orientation on the Zapatista movement’s history and objectives so 
that they understand and the movement and its ideology (Educational Travel 
Programs, 2014). 
Zapatista educational programs are markedly different from those 
found in other parts of Mexico.  As the indigenous communities in Chiapas 
have retained a greater sense of identity than other indigenous enclaves, 
traditional forms of education appear alongside modern subjects.  In addition 
to learning local indigenous language, history, and culture, students also 
learn modern languages and natural sciences.  Students also gain practical 
knowledge in traditional medicine, business, and agriculture as they work 
and learn alongside “education promoters,” who are volunteer teachers 
selected by their local communities (Mayan Schools of Dignity, 2014). 
An issue, however, is that Brown runs this outpost of the Zapatista 
movement with little support.  He has two other board members, Ernie 
McCray and Adriana Barraza, who occupy the positions of secretary and 
treasurer respectively.  While Ernie and Adriana have demonstrated a 
commitment to the Zapatista movement by serving on this board, 
volunteering a few hours a week of their time to promoting Schools for 
Chiapas, and donating financially to their organization, it is Brown who 
travels frequently to Chiapas to put his NGO’s work and fundraising into 
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practice.  While it is possible that Schools for Chiapas will cease to exist in its 
current form should Brown decide to disengage from the movement, he has 
been committed to the cause for over twenty years, indicating it will continue 
at least until his death or incapacitation.  While it is possible that the EZLN’s 
regard for the organization would allow another leader to take Brown’s place 
and seamlessly continue the work of Schools for Chiapas, there is no clear 
successor for Brown, which is cause for concern.  Unless he is able to 
constitute a larger board from among the many volunteers that have worked 
alongside the EZLN, Brown risks the organization’s dissolution without a 
clear succession plan. 
The mission statement of Schools for Chiapas offers a clear and precise 
description vis-à-vis the organization’s activities, in that it “supports the 
autonomous, indigenous communities of Chiapas, Mexico in their efforts to 
create a just, democratic, and dignified education including autonomous 
schools, community health centers, ecological agricultural studies, and 
alternative market development.” This gives both a general description of 
what Schools for Chiapas supports and then explains some of the ways in 
which the organization goes about implementing these goals.  
Further, the vision of Schools for Chiapas is clearly stated in the 
mission statement in that the organization “join[s] people of conscience 
everywhere in promoting alternative models of education and action that 
challenge and resist environmental degradation and human exploitation” 
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(GuideStar Report, 2015). Schools for Chiapas embraces not just the work 
that the Zapatista movement does in the local community; it also codifies its 
commitment to the movement’s political and economic goals within 
documents filed each year with the IRS in its Form 990.   
It is likely that Brown worked with EZLN leadership to establish the 
goals and mission of Schools for Chiapas as his work was not interrupted by 
the promulgation of The Thirteenth Stele, which resulted in numerous NGOs 
withdrawing from Zapatista controlled areas.  Rather, he was forced to focus 
his attentions internationally due to the previously mentioned two year ban 
from entering Mexico after he organized the construction of a school for rural 
citizens in the village of Oventic.  This ban was only overturned when the 
PRI was ousted in the 2000 elections that brought Fox to power (Smith, 
2000).   
This close connection and long-lasting relationship with the EZLN 
demonstrates not just the power that social capital bonds can have in 
maintaining meaningful connections, but it also indicates the criteria that 
the Zapatista movement has for civil society organizations that wish to 
operate within their autonomous municipalities.  In keeping with the parallel 
structure of autonomous municipalities and federally supported 
municipalities (the local bureaucracies that have official support from the 
Mexican federal government) that, the Zapatista movement does use an 
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incentive based structure to reward villages and municipalities that remain 
committed to the movement (Barmeyer).   
The parallel structure of governance created by the Zapatistas must be 
accepted by any NGO operating within the autonomous communities as the 
EZLN maintains control over incoming development aid, directing it where 
they deem it necessary and taking a small percentage to maintain the 
movement (ibid).  The Zapatistas, however, have made efforts to continue 
building bridging social capital between groups in Chiapas, whether they are 
supporters of the movement or not.  Indeed, “an invitation was extended to 
the non-Zapatista indigenous population to make use of the services offered 
by the autonomous municipalities, such as education and conflict resolution” 
(van der Haar, 106).  Further, Schools for Chiapas provides educational 
services for all those living within Chiapas and the autonomous 
municipalities, regardless of ethnicity and EZLN affiliation. 
There are major structural issues with Schools for Chiapas, however.  
No matter how dedicated Peter Brown and his small board are, they are only 
three people. Furthermore, the organization operates with little 
transparency. While the board must approve the projects Schools for Chiapas 
finances, the Zapatista leadership likely selects these projects and priorities. 
While this is not an issue, per se, it arguably reveals that Schools for Chiapas 
is simply the American fundraising and friend-raising arm of the Zapatista 
movement.  Nevertheless, Brown has significant ties to the EZLN, and his 
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work has resulted in numerous volunteers from across the United States 
traveling to Chiapas and living through shared experiences with locals, 
creating stronger bonds than a membership based organization would be able 
to forge.  Yet, if anything altered the status quo in Chiapas, the organization 
could be affected.   
When Schools for Chiapas is viewed through the lens of social 
solidarity, however, the organization takes on a different dimension.  It is a 
supporting organization as opposed to a true NGO, allowing it to occupy a 
position of advocacy, programming, and fundraising on behalf of the 
Zapatista movement.  This is only possible because of the bonds of social 
capital that exist between Peter Brown and his organization and the EZLN.  
With an organization that is cautious when it comes to outside involvement, 
Schools for Chiapas has created and maintained a position of trust through 
its work and contributions to the Zapatista movement, as demonstrated by 
their continued involvement in the region when other organizations have 
been expelled and the proximity of volunteers to Zapatista villages that is 
typically reserved for trusted supporters (Barmeyer). 
1.7 Applying Literature to the Zapatista Movement 
Using the literature previously reviewed, this thesis will now examine 
the Zapatista movement and Schools for Chiapas as parts of civil society and 
social capital generating institutions.  With Diamond’s basic definition of civil 
society, there is an open and voluntary component as neither the EZLN nor 
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Schools for Chiapas force or coerce membership or participation from 
locals.  While the EZLN is certainly autonomous from the government, a key 
aim of the group, it has become a de facto government in parts of Chiapas.  
This means that the collaborative efforts of Schools for Chiapas are 
only somewhat autonomous as they, and the NGO sector in general, must 
rely on the Zapatista movement for support and legitimacy 
(Barmeyer).  NGOs and the EZLN leadership, however, accept a shared set of 
rules vis-à-vis provisions of service.  Thus, the Zapatista movement, broadly, 
and Schools for Chiapas, specifically, fulfill the majority of Diamond’s 
characteristics for civil society. 
Habermas adds to this definition when he proclaims that civil society 
and social movements are meant to appear spontaneously, reflecting the 
desires of the citizenry while also spreading the movement or organization’s 
message to a broader audience.  The EZLN grew as a result of local 
dissatisfaction that had compounded for decades without proper government 
intervention.  Schools for Chiapas, meanwhile, came from an expressed 
desire by both the citizenry and the Zapatista movement to improve 
educational opportunities.   
Viewing the Zapatista movement and Schools for Chiapas through 
Peyton and Moody’s conception of philanthropy, the actions of both 
organizations are voluntary and intended to promote a conception of the 
public good.  The voluntary action is due to the fact that neither side is 
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coercive or coerced into participation.  A caveat, however, must be considered 
in that Schools for Chiapas does not have the operating freedom to determine 
what programs institute or where they run them.  Rather, the EZLN will 
theoretically determine the areas of most need and disperse aid there.  In 
practice this does not always occur; however, this is does challenge the 
EZLN’s status as a philanthropic actor to a degree as the movement does 
partially restrict civil society. 
Berry’s discussion of citizen groups presents a curious contrast with 
the Zapatista movement.  Examining the US and Western democratic 
traditions, Berry concludes that while a social movement may form, their 
efforts will be largely restricted to mobilization and lobbying as opposed to 
direct democracy through participatory institutions.  This trend, while 
observable in the United States and likely in central Mexico, was opposite in 
Chiapas.  The social movement that formed around the EZLN certainly 
mobilized and lobbied government, making trips to Mexico City to seek 
redress, but they also applied a local concept of governing by listening.   
Utilizing local forms of participation that pre-dated the EZLN, the 
Zapatista movement promotes local participation from all citizens and 
informs policy decisions from local discussions and decisions.  Meanwhile, 
international supporters of the EZLN will behave in a manner similar to 
what Berry predicts.  Schools for Chiapas sometimes behaves like a US 
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citizen group by engaging in lobbying and grassroots activism at an 
international level. 
Another key area to examine is the need for a social movement, like 
the Zapatista movement, to emerge from the local political system.  As 
Diamond describes, the EZLN emerged to serve as a mechanism for the 
population to express their discontent with government.  With Diamond’s 
addendum that social movements are particularly helpful when elections do 
not accurately show citizen preferences and passions, the raison d'être of the 
EZLN becomes less opaque.   
As seen, the Mexican national government spent few resources 
developing Chiapas and was unresponsive to the needs of the local mestizo 
and indigenous population.  This created the necessary space and impetus for 
the EZLN to coalesce and gain support within the local population.  By 
occupying this space, the Zapatista movement has been able to transform 
from a short-lived insurgency to a de facto autonomous state within a state.  
The EZLN continues to press the Mexican federal government for greater 
constitutional and political freedoms for indigenous and poor Mexicans, and 
the movement continues to function as a parallel government within areas of 
control.   
By adjusting how they accept and distribute NGO funding, the 
Zapatista movement has also avoided a major pitfall that Diamond examines.  
By distributing funding and projects as needed and serving as a convener, the 
48 
EZLN ensures that the movement’s goals are not subverted by outside 
interests and avoids any single part of the movement becoming too reliant on 
foreign funding.  Further, the Zapatistas have cultivated and engaged with 
NGOs, like Schools for Chiapas, so that funding is known and projects are 
agreed upon.  Not constantly focused on securing funds, the Zapatista 
movement can focus on maintaining membership and providing services to 
the citizens they work with. 
Due in part to this control over international funding, the EZLN has 
not been forced to contend with international donors attempting to subvert of 
undermine the goals of the movement.  The Jenkins and Halcli argument 
that social movement philanthropy will undercut the most radical forces for 
change is not evidenced in this case study.  This argument might presuppose 
a completely free civil society, however, which neither the Zapatista 
movement nor the Mexican federal government permit.  With the Zapatistas 
working as a convener and distributor of funding for aid projects, the 
movement has perhaps eliminated most opportunities for their mission and 
message to be subverted by outside interests.  Instead, the Mexican 
government’s paramilitary groups offer the main alternative to the Zapatista 
movement within Chiapas. 
Fung’s description of social movements fits the Zapatistas perhaps 
most closely.  His conception of social movements is more expansive than 
many others, allowing them to not only serve as schools of democracy but also 
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as a form of resistance to the government.  With local forms of participatory 
democracy as a template, the Zapatistas have introduced local autonomy 
throughout the areas they control, and Fung describes this trend almost 
exactly. 
As Benford and Snow theorize, the EZLN has sought to frame their 
movement in the face of government repression and propaganda.  Marcos and 
the leadership have actively attempted to dispel notions that the Zapatistas 
are external agents or part of the urban intelligentsia.  As part of the 
diagnostic framing process, the EZLN argued that it was an inclusive 
movement composed of both indigenous Mexicans and poor mestizo farmers 
opposed to the political and economic repression committed by the federal 
government, which fits the injustice model that Benford and Snow offer.  
In the case of the prognostic framing, the Zapatistas initially used 
violent rebellion to accomplish social change, but they quickly reframed the 
situation when a ceasefire was brokered and actively lobbied for a political 
resolution that would accomplish the movement’s key demands of increased 
indigenous rights and a rejection of neoliberal economic policies.  Finally, the 
EZLN utilized motivational framing for both internal and external audiences.  
Though the vocabulary used has remained decisive and called for action, it no 
longer calls for violent rebellion. 
While the EZLN has transformed into a powerful and widely supported 
social movement, it is likely the Zapatistas would have been violently crushed 
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decades ago without the large amounts of bonding and bridging social capital 
created by the movement and its partners.  The Mexican government had 
shown its willingness to engage the EZLN with overwhelming, 
disproportional force before the movement’s supporters were able to organize 
demonstrations and the Western media started to cover the violent campaign 
as a result of protests opposed to the military response throughout Europe.  
This press coverage resulted in political pressure from Western trade 
partners who worried about human rights violations. 
 The EZLN started as a mix of local indigenous and mestizo members.  
Even among the indigenous membership, many early Zapatistas hailed from 
a diverse collection of indigenous sub-groups with enclaves throughout the 
state of Chiapas.  This fulfills a key requirement of Smith’s, where a social 
movement must be composed of various groups of stakeholders, internally, to 
succeed. 
Although Robert Putnam excludes social movements from his calculus 
of the formation of social capital, most other scholars examined allow some 
space for these organizations.  Foley and Edwards agree with Putnam that 
massive, diffuse membership organizations are not conducive to either 
bonding or bridging social capital; however, the Zapatista movement does not 
function like the national and international organizations Putnam examines.   
Rather, Smith’s analysis of social movements creating transnational 
social capital through the Internet is observed vis-à-vis the Zapatista 
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movement. Although the movement’s initial leadership did not post 
manifestos online, they did use networks of trusted contacts and friends to 
distribute speeches and ideological writings to both Mexican and 
international audiences. Supporters cultivated these connections to create a 
web of members and supporters that repopulates membership and remains 
engaged in the movement, even after two decades of involvement in some 
cases (Olesen). 
While the PRI has lost many of its authoritarian trappings following 
losses at the polls, the Mexican government retains an electoral 
authoritarianism as it continues to suppress democratic movements and 
practices (Hernandez, 2014).  This remains especially true for many 
indigenous Mexicans. Mungiu-Pippidi argues that states transitioning from 
authoritarian rule to functioning democracy will start with grassroots 
organizations that strengthen bonds over time to become democratic 
institutions, and that is gradually happening with the Zapatista movement.  
While the EZLN does not have authority throughout the entire state of 
Chiapas, they have succeeded in supplanting government control throughout 
the central regions of the state.  With local councils elected by all the 
citizenry and a system of democracy that recognizes every individual’s right 
to give input, the grassroots Zapatista movement has been strengthened into 
a democratic institution within Chiapas (Mentinis). 
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Finally, the EZLN demonstrates the veracity of many of Minkoff’s 
claims.  The Zapatistas might have been primarily focused on the plight of 
indigenous Mexicans, but their rhetoric and actions have improved the lives 
of mestizo peasants living within Chiapas.  Further, the Zapatista 
movement’s success at surviving in Chiapas for two decades and creating a 
parallel government in the states is arguable dwarfed in importance by the 
focus and international attention they drew to the plight of the indigenous.  
The EZLN was able to shape the message and force a debate on the rights 
guaranteed to indigenous Mexicans.  While many of their demands, including 
land reform, have been ignored, the Zapatistas caused many Mexican states 
to codify rights, protections, and privileges for the indigenous population. 
1.8 Concluding Thoughts on the EZLN 
The Zapatista movement has not managed to take Mexico City or 
create franchises throughout the nation, but that was never the movement’s 
goal.  Indigenous citizens, from Chiapas, have led the EZLN since its 
inception, and although the movement accepted support and aid from groups 
from all around Mexico and the world, their propaganda and public relations 
efforts have focused on gaining and retaining support.  The movement calls 
on supporters to visit Chiapas and take lessons back to their own states or 
countries, but they have largely refrained from exporting their revolution.   
Perhaps this is a political calculation in that the Mexican federal 
government now tolerates the Zapatistas.  The movement could be loath to 
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escalate hostilities by moving beyond the isolated and sparsely populated 
state of Chiapas where they have cultivated a large amount of support and 
social capital.  Whatever the case, the Zapatista movement appears as 
though it will remain a de facto autonomous state for the immediate future.  
Although they must contend with sporadic paramilitary attacks, the EZLN 
has been successful in implementing democratic forms of self-governance, as 
a parallel alternative to federal authority, throughout Chiapas.  While not 
the type of social movement that Putnam would examine, the EZLN 
represents a different kind of grassroots movement that has promoted the 
formation of social capital and allowed civil society to, relatively, flourish. 
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2.0 Introduction to the Iraqi Kurdish Case 
The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has existed in Northern Iraq 
since 1992; however, it has roots in ancillary movements that started in the 
1940s following World War II.  This case study will examine the history of the 
KRG, discuss how it has at times resembled a social movement, and critique 
the KRG’s policies and actions as it attempts to move forward from regional 
autonomy to full independence.  This case study will also examine the 
coalition of interests that make up the KRG and its principle competitors and 
how these interests interact in the collective push for the creation of a 
sovereign, democratic Kurdistan.   
First, however, it must be understood that this is primarily an ethnic, 
political, and military movement and rather than a traditional grassroots 
social movement.  While the Zapatista movement utilized ties with external 
NGOs and ideological partners, the KRG and its various parties have instead 
focused on pragmatic ties to international governments throughout its 
history.  This demonstrates the diverse ways politically marginalized ethnic 
groups can utilize distinct strategies to achieve democratic self-governance. 
2.1 The Historical Roots of the Kurdish Question 
 The Kurds have occupied land in modern Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran 
for over a millennium; Kurdish origin stories identify their ancestors as the 
Medes who usurped the Assyrian Empire and the Kardouchoi who defeated 
the Persian Empire’s elite 10,000, as recounted by Xenophon in the Anabasis 
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(Gunter, Kurds Ascending , 2008).  Conquered by the Arabs during their 
Mesopotamia and Turkish campaigns, the name “Kurd” was first applied, 
and great heroes of Islam like Saladin emerged from this newly Islamized 
population (Gunter, Kurds Ascending).   
With most Kurds living in the Ottoman Empire, early attempts to gain 
independence or autonomy for a Kurdish state were infrequent.  This was 
especially true given the tribal nature of the Kurdish people and the 
geography of the region.  With mountains separating Kurds in Turkey from 
those in Syria and Iraq and similar ranges separating Iraqi Kurds from their 
Iranian counterparts, both geographical and cultural barriers stunted ethnic 
movements.  As many tribes had little interaction with one another, they 
developed unique cultures, religious practices, and even languages 
(Hassanpour).   
Except for one ill-fated attempt to revolt against the Ottomans, there 
were no major ethnic Kurdish attempts to mobilize for sovereignty.  Kurdish 
soldiers bolstered Ottoman units in World War I and subsequently supported 
Ataturk’s campaign for Turkey (Gunter, Kurds Ascending).  At this point, 
however, the first meaningful discussions of a Kurdish state began as 
President Woodrow Wilson and his European allies divided the former 
Ottoman Empire.  While many Kurdish leaders responded to this possibility 
with enthusiasm, the post-World War I treaty that defined the borders of 
Kurdistan was unappealing to many others (ibid).   
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2.2 The Origins of a Potential Modern Kurdish State 
The Treaty of Sèvres certainly included a provision for the creation of a 
Kurdish state, but it also divided the Anatolian peninsula into a number of 
smaller states and ceded land to European nations like France and Greece.  
As Kurds had fought with distinction in the Ottoman military, some 
disagreed with these divisions and joined Ataturk in the Turkish national 
movement.  Thus when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1926, Turkey’s 
borders were secure but without any provision for a Kurdish state (O’Leary, 
et. al.).  
Because not all Kurds were pleased with Ataturk’s secular and Turkic-
centric reforms, there were three major Kurdish revolts in a little more than 
a decade.  This was arguably the start of the Kurdish ethnic movement.  The 
reasons for revolt varied, however.  The first movement was a result of 
religious conservative Kurds rejecting the secular nature of modern Turkey, 
but the next two revolts were transnational military campaigns that 
stretched from Lebanon to Iran.  While these revolts were short-lived, they 
began a new, international movement based around the Kurdish ethnic 
identity without regard to national borders (Gunter, Kurds Ascending). 
This trend continued into the post World War II period of 
decolonization.  Seeking to expand their influence and counterbalance 
Western interests in the region, the Soviet Union supported a small Kurdish 
separatist movement in northwest Iran.  Although their goals were initially 
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confined to autonomy and regional self-governance, the local elites expanded 
their ambitions and declared the creation of the Republic of Mahabad in 
January of 1946 (Gunter, Kurds of Iraq, 1992).   
Led by Islamic jurist Qazi Muhammad, the republic weathered 
numerous attacks from Iranian forces, which saw the movement as an 
illegitimate rebellion.  The Kurds resisted these attacks for less than a year 
before falling in December, due mostly to the withdrawal of the Soviet 
military from Iran as proscribed by the Yalta Agreement.  Qazi was executed 
for treason, and many Kurdish nationalists fled to the Soviet Union (King, 
2014). 
2.3 The Beginning of a Kurdish Regional Government 
One of these refugees was the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani.  
Leader of the prominent Kurdish Barzani clan from Northern Iraq, Mustafa 
and many of his loyal tribesman and supporters had fled to Kurdish Iran in 
1943 following an unsuccessful rebellion against the British mandate of Iraq 
and their government in Baghdad.  Inspired initially as much by anti-
imperialism and tribal politics as by ethnicity, Mustafa became increasingly 
supportive of the Kurdish nationalist cause during his time in the Republic of 
Mahabad (O’Leary, et. al.).  After years of moving from one Soviet state to 
another, Barzani and his followers returned to Iraq when Abd al-Karim 
Qasim deposed the British backed monarchy. 
58 
Qasim and Barzani rapidly established a positive relationship.  Elected 
to head the newly formed Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Mustafa was 
the most powerful Kurd in Iraq.  He led the largest Kurdish political 
organization, and he was also the leader of one of the largest and most 
notable Kurdish clans in Iraq.  This gave Barzani tremendous power in 
Northern Iraq, and Qasim sought to use this power as a counterbalance to 
internal forces that challenged his rule.  Mustafa was an adept politician, and 
he sought to increase his clan’s power and prestige through alliances and 
social capital creation (Rubin, 2007). 
While the KDP rapidly built and consolidated power in Northern Iraq, 
Barzani recognized that the local communist party had a strong base of 
power in the region among both urban workers and the intelligentsia, and he 
feared they would be a challenge to his future leadership of a Kurdish state.  
Rather than react with hostilities, however, Mustafa instead elevated a 
communist official to Secretary General of the KDP, allying himself with the 
Iraqi Communist Party (ICP).  When the ICP began to lose favor in Baghdad, 
however, Barzani favored political expedience to the social bonds his alliance 
with the communists had yielded.  Despite the fact that the KDP and ICP 
had fought together to put down an Arab insurrection in Mosul on behalf of 
Qasim, Barzani severed all ties with the communists when Baghdad began to 
marginalize the party (O’Leary, et. al.). 
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  The sudden cessation of the alliance between the KDP and the ICP 
certainly kept Mustafa aligned with Qasim, but it caused prominent Kurds to 
begin privately doubting the integrity and priorities of Barzani and his 
followers.  As Qasim began to distrust his ally, he moved against Barzani by 
promoting dissention among the Kurdish tribes and notables.  This was 
meant to block the hegemony that Mustafa sought in the Kurdish regions of 
Iraq, and Qasim was successful at first.  He soon, however, was engaged in 
open conflict with Mustafa, which lead to a destructive military campaign 
against the KDP.  Barzani again displayed his political acumen, engaging 
with the United States, Soviet Union, and Iran in a bid to counter the Iraqi 
military (Ghareeb, 1981). 
2.4 A Military Campaign for Autonomy? 
With little concern for Cold War alliances, Barzani adroitly utilized 
whatever connections he could to counter Qasim.  The alliances Mustafa 
constructed were sometimes short-term partnerships, but his connections 
with the United States would come to define the Kurdish struggle for 
autonomy in future decades.  Further, Barzani began to engage with the 
various pan-Arab politicians that he had once fought against in Mosul as a 
way to ensure future political connections and relevance once Qasim fell.  
This was only a matter of time, Barzani theorized, as he worked to erode 
Qasim’s power by refusing peace overtures and lengthening the military 
conflict between the KDP and the Iraqi military (Gunter, Kurds of Iraq).   
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Mustafa publicly demanded full Kurdish autonomy, which did help to 
repair relations with Kurdish clans who thought he was not doing enough for 
the Kurdish cause.  For the next few decades, this same scenario would 
repeat multiple times under successive Iraqi governments.  Mustafa would 
attempt to engage with Baghdad, and relations would improve to the point of 
meaningful negotiations; however, the Iraqi government only gave token 
autonomy to the Kurds and the KDP.   
In multiple cycles of violence, the KDP would reject peace deals or end 
agreements with the Iraqi government and resume hostilities in order to 
secure political autonomy.  Barzani continued to engage whomever he could 
in order to advance his cause, ending his relationship with the Soviet Union 
after it began to embrace the Iraqi government.  Thus, the KDP strengthened 
ties with the United States, began to receive aid from Israel, and continued 
relations with Iran.  These engagements with the West, however, cost 
Barzani support within the KDP and the Kurdish population.  This 
discontent, combined with personal and clan differences, resulted in the 
formation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in 1975 (Ghareeb). 
2.5 The End of Single-Party Rule and Conflicting Kurdish Visions 
Unlike the KDP, which was completely controlled by Mustafa Barzani, 
the PUK was a coalition of political interests with a diverse leadership core.  
The foundation and leadership of the PUK was composed of notable clan 
leaders and politicians and leaders included Jalal Talabani, Nawshirwan 
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Mustafa, and Fuad Masum.  These men represented center-left, Marxist-
Leninist, and social-democratic ideology, respectively, and they offered an 
alternative to the autocratic policies of Mustafa Barzani and the KDP.  These 
men had known one another for decades, and they had strong bonds of social 
capital to go along with their impeccable records of fighting for an 
autonomous Kurdistan in Iraq as members of the KDP (Gunter, KDP-PUK 
Conflict, 1996). 
While KDP possessed tremendous bonding social capital based on the 
power and size of the Barzani clan, they lacked any bridging social capital 
with many of the other Kurdish clans that they had attempted to suppress 
over the decades, with the communists Mustafa had betrayed early in his 
career, and with the intelligentsia who desired true democratic self-
governance and autonomy as opposed to an autocratic political system 
dominated by the Barzani clan (Ghareeb).  These groups helped to form a 
viable alternative to the KDP as they drew grassroots support with both local 
notables, particularly from the Sulaymaniyah area, and workers with 
socialist or communist leanings.   
Another key difference between the KDP and the PUK was the PUK’s 
willingness to engage Kurds in Syria, Turkey, and Iran while the KDP 
preferred to focus only on Iraqi Kurds (Ghareeb).  This pragmatic action by 
Mustafa and his successor and son, Masoud, allowed the KDP to find support 
in regional and international governments while the PUK was supported by 
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Kurds in regional neighbors but not by the non-Kurds who controlled the 
governments and traditionally suppressed Kurdish ambitions within their 
own borders. 
Like the KDP, the PUK dominated the associational life of its 
supporters.  Party affiliation or clan membership was of enormous 
importance, and these political structures also defined associational life.  At 
times, these two parties actively suppressed their rivals and limited civil 
liberties.  The KDP, and Barzani especially, have been accused of limiting 
civil society through military attacks on the PUK and the suppression of 
other opposition political and media groups.  Though these actions have 
declined, they were especially prevalent whenever Mustafa and Masoud 
attempted to secure their personal power and their clan’s position within 
Iraqi Kurdistan and the region. 
2.6 Rival Parties Coalesce for a New Push for Freedom 
While the KDP and the PUK clashed from the time of the latter’s 
formation in 1975, the two groups came together in the aftermath of the Gulf 
War.  The two groups joined in 1983 to rebel against Saddam Hussein, but 
their campaign resulted in the deaths of over a hundred thousand Kurdish 
civilians and the imposition of numerous anti-Kurd laws to forestall future 
rebellions.  During the course of the hostilities, the Hussein regime directed 
attacks against civilian populations, including the 1988 gassing of thousands 
of Kurds in the town of Halabja (Human Rights Watch, 1995).  The attack 
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resulted in the deaths of thousands of Kurds and “[t]he atrocity at Halabja 
scarred the collective memory of Iraqi Kurds and hardened their 
determination to run their own affairs autonomously within a loose Iraqi 
federation” (BBC, 2013). 
This massacre, and subsequent attacks on Kurdish populations from 
Baghdad following Saddam’s defeat in the Gulf War, resulted in the United 
States establishing a security and no-fly zone under the banner “Operation 
Provide Comfort” in 1991, a campaign that would end the refugee crisis 
sparked by Saddam’s massacre of civilians and offer “a promise of some 
degree of autonomy from Baghdad” (Haulman, 182).  With US military and 
political support, the dream of an autonomous Kurdistan was suddenly a 
reality.  While this autonomy was de facto, like the Zapatista’s autonomy, it 
was embraced by both the KDP and the PUK, who joined together to form the 
first Kurdish Regional Government (Gunter, Kurds Ascending).   
2.7 The Kurdish Civil War, A Brief Argument Before Autonomy  
Hoping to govern effectively, the KDP and PUK agreed to form a unity 
government after the 1992 elections; however, political differences and 
ambitions quickly ended this government and resulted in the Kurdish Civil 
War.  While the PUK turned to Kurdish allies from Syria and Turkey, the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and Iranian allies, the KDP allied with 
Saddam Hussein and asked for assistance against the PUK (ibid).  Like his 
father, Masoud engaged with anyone who would further his goals.   
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This civil war again demonstrates the deep divisions between Kurds 
that existed both within Iraq and within the international Kurdish 
population.  Fighting continued between the two groups and their allies until 
1998 when the United States was able to broker a peace agreement between 
the PUK and the KDP (Haulman).  The treaty remained intact, and the two 
groups joined together again during the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.  
Supported by US air superiority, the two Kurdish groups struck against 
Hussein’s military installations in northern Iraq, defeating opposition in 
Mosul and Kirkuk.  Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani and their parties 
cooperated at a level not seen since their earlier ill-fated 1983 campaign 
against Saddam Hussein. This time, however, they had the backing of the 
United States and a clear path to de jure autonomy as opposed to the de facto 
autonomy enjoyed since the US no-fly zone and the cessation of the Kurdish 
Civil War (Gunter, Kurds Ascending). 
This cooperation led to a political rapprochement between the two 
quarreling parties. Since the Kurdish Civil War and the subsequent US 
brokered peace accord, the KDP held sway in central and northwest Iraqi 
Kurdistan while the PUK controlled the land around their traditional 
stronghold of Sulaymaniyah in the southeast of the region; however, the two 
organizations realized that the future of an independent Kurdistan relied on 
their political cooperation as well as their military cooperation.  
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2.8 A Kurdish Federal State Under the Iraqi Constitution 
With the connections that Barzani and Talabani had cultivated in the 
West, Russia, Turkey, and Israel, the US-led coalition and many regional 
neighbors backed de jure autonomy for the Kurds. Article 117(1) of the 
Western backed Iraqi Constitution, approved in 2005, declared “[t]his 
Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of Kurdistan, 
along with its existing authorities, as a federal region” (Al-Ali, 2005, 37).  
Kurdish authority over the autonomous region was further reinforced in 
Article 141, which states that “[l]egislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan 
since 1992 shall remain in force, and decisions issued by the government of 
the region of Kurdistan, […] provided that they do not contradict with the 
Constitution” (44). 
With constitutional recognition, the Kurdish dream seemed complete.  
In a landmark agreement, Talabani agreed to serve as President of Iraq 
while Barzani would lead a unified KRG as president.  This agreement ended 
the partitions of control that had previously existed between the two Persian 
Gulf wars.  While the PUK and KDP certainly still exist, they have governed 
the KRG in a tenuous coalition.   
Since the conclusion of his own presidency, Talabani’s close friend and 
political ally Fuad Masum has occupied the largely ceremonial position.  
Barzani, meanwhile, received an extension on his presidency from the KRG 
parliament.  This has been a contentious issue, as many Iraqi Kurds want to 
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move on from the KDP/PUK political duality and the tight control of the 
Barzani family.  One main complaint about Masoud Barzani is his perceived 
lack of commitment to true Kurdish independence.  This complaint, and 
others, contributed to the formation of a nationalist opposition slate of 
candidates, organized under the banner of the Change List by former PUK 
leader and co-founder, Nawshirwan Mustafa (Albayrak, 2014). 
2.9 Autonomy Is Not Enough: Renewed Calls for Independence  
While the KRG has considerable political autonomy, many still hope 
for a push for true independence.  In the face of the Iraqi federal 
government’s failure to provide security for the nation in the face of sectarian 
violence, most notably the so-called Islamic State’s (known as Daesh locally) 
capture of swathes of Iraqi territory and frequent attacks on Kurds, many in 
the KRG see this as an ideal opportunity to break away from Baghdad.  
While this potential secession does not have support from the Abadi 
government (Chambers and Coles, 2016), there is little the Iraqi government 
could do to stop Kurdish independence given the wide support that the KRG 
has cultivated in the fight against Daesh and other extremist organizations. 
The Iraqi Kurds have maintained their extensive relationships both in 
the region and internationally.  The KRG now receives weapons and supplies 
directly from European nations like Germany, circumventing the central 
government.  They are also seen as the most competent and fierce fighters 
against terrorist elements, defeating numerous offensives launched by Daesh 
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and remnants of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist military, most notably the 
Naqshbandi Army, an insurgent group formed by Saddam’s close advisor and 
deputy Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri (BBC, 2014).   
Further, the KRG used the instability to retake the traditionally 
Kurdish city of Kirkuk.  This city and the surrounding lands were lost during 
Saddam Hussein’s Arabization program, and the KRG has repeatedly 
attempted to regain the land.  With the deterioration of security, the Kurds 
have been able to take the land and position themselves as protectors of the 
local Kurds, Turkmens, and Arabs in a move that has drawn protests from 
Baghdad (van Wildenburg, 2015). 
With Kirkuk’s rich oil reserves, an independent Kurdistan could 
survive economically through trade with Turkey.  The Turkish government 
already has good economic and political ties with the KDP, and the KRG in 
general; however, there is a chance that Turkey will vehemently oppose any 
independence movement, fearing it will embolden truculent Kurds within 
their own nation (Park).  As the KRG prepares its peshmerga forces to 
recapture Mosul, in concert with Shiite militias and the Iraqi Army, a bid for 
independence might be put off until the Kurdish borders are secured against 
Daesh.  Barzani, however, has acceded to internal pressure and promised a 
referendum on the issue of independence in 2016 (Rudaw, 2016).   
The pathway to democratic self-governance for Iraq’s Kurds has been 
long and often contradictory, with the Barzanis focusing on maintaining their 
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own power while only indirectly pressing for self-governance or independence 
unless pressed by the majority of Iraqi Kurds into greater action.  The 
Talibani coalition that makes up the PUK, meanwhile, served as an 
alternative to the KDP until they entered into their fractious coalition.  While 
Talabani and other Kurdish politicians have not publicly embraced the 
current conception of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan, there is a large 
amount of latent support from the populace that might force the majority of 
the KRG into supporting this transition. 
2.10 Applying the Literature to the Iraqi Kurdish Case 
 All three of the major Kurdish political institutions, the KRG, the 
PUK, and the Change List, emerged as reactions to distinct societal issues 
that affected individuals in the regions the organizations emerged from.  The 
KRG initially emerged in response to the political and social 
disenfranchisement of Kurds in Northern Iraq while the PUK was founded in 
response and protest to the mono-party control of the Barzani clan.  Finally, 
the Change List was founded and received enormous support from the 
grassroots in response to the rampant corruption that has plagued the KRG 
and the PUK.  With this in mind, the Kurdish political parties fit Habermas’ 
litmus test for inclusion into civil society. 
 Supporters of the KRG, the PUK, and most recently the Change List 
all promote democratic practices as these are part of each organization’ public 
platform.  By publicly supporting them and voting for them in the various 
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regional and national elections, these organizations help to promote a 
Tocquevillian conception of philanthropy as they promote democratic norms 
and practices in the private life.  Every individual in Iraqi Kurdistan has 
equal standing, regardless of ethnicity, political affiliation, or religion. 
 The various social-political organizations that make up Iraqi Kurdish 
associational life engage in collective action through protest, rebellion, and 
political action, but they have also served at times as national citizen groups.  
When these groups have been out of power or working to advance the 
Kurdish cause in Baghdad or internationally, the KRG and PUK have both 
engaged governments and civil society actors on behalf of their supporters 
and members.  This matches Berry’s definition of citizen groups as they will 
lobby and educate on behalf of the Kurdish people that they purport to 
represent. 
 The emergence of the KRG, PUK, and Change List in response to a 
lack of responsive politics or public corruption is in keeping with Diamond’s 
theory that social movements serve as a democratic check for the population.  
The massive amount of support that transferred to the PUK when it split 
from an unresponsive KRG and the emergence of the Change List in response 
to perceived institutional corruption both reinforce this theory in the Iraqi 
Kurdish case.  Creating new movements allows for the citizenry to register 
their discontent and pressure the government for reforms.  The willingness of 
Kurds to defect from the organizations they had previously supported and 
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move to new groups also supports Mangiu-Pippidi’s argument that collective 
action can serve as a counterbalance to autocratic governments as it weakens 
the power of the KRG or PUK and demonstrates a rejection of corruption, 
cronyism, or unpopular political stances.  
 Recent shifts and realignments in Iraqi Kurdish politics and policies 
also support the argument, put forward by Jenkins and Halcli, that 
international funders can impact the priorities of social movements.  While 
the Iraqi Kurdish organizations all had some level of cooperation with Syrian 
Kurds, these relationships have been strained in response to Turkish 
pressures.   
As the Turkish government seeks to marginalize the Syrian Kurds, 
long linked with Kurdish separatists in the south of Turkey, a once friendly 
relationship between Iraqi and Syrian Kurds has become increasingly 
fractious.  Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish trade is too important to sacrifice, even 
if that results in decreased military cooperation and a public pivot away from 
a greater Kurdistan that transcends national boundaries.  Further, Turkish 
and American patronage is directed mainly towards the KRG as they are 
perceived as the least radical of the Kurdish organizations vis-à-vis ideology. 
As Fung contends, Kurds in Northern Iraq have substituted their own 
democratic practices and organizations rather than adapting to Iraqi national 
politics.  As a frequently oppressed ethnic minority group, Iraqi Kurds used 
the creation of distinct Kurdish organizations to resist the oppressive policies 
71 
of the central government.  At times, Iraqi Kurdish organizations, especially 
the KRG, have neglected to develop civic virtues as they have sought to resist 
the various central government that have violently repressed the Iraqi 
Kurds. 
Throughout the history of the KRG and PUK, the Kurdish 
organizations have framed their struggle as a search for political and social 
freedoms in the face of various oppressive regimes.  While this is a case of 
injustice framing, the prognostic framing of the struggle has changed over 
time.  Initially, the KRG was publicly fighting for political autonomy from the 
central government; however, the PUK and Change List have both pressured 
the KRG into publicly accepting a transition to true independence as a 
solution for the marginalization that many Iraqi Kurds feel.  This 
prognostication further influences the motivational framing of the Kurdish 
organizations as the vocabulary has shifted from a push for total autonomy to 
a demand for true independence. 
In the Iraqi Kurdish case, the argument for social capital is muddled.  
There is a large amount of hegemony within each organization, but 
supporters of the KRG, PUK, and Change List have little regard for one 
another.  Kurdish politics remain fractious, and there appears to be relatively 
little bridging social capital between each organization.  At the same time, 
members of the KRG, PUK, and Change List all have substantial connections 
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and trust with other members of the same group.  This indicates a large 
amount of bonding social capital within each individual group.   
In the case of the KRG and to a lesser extent the PUK, there also 
exists substantial bridging social capital with regional and world 
governments and organizations.  The KRG is closely allied with the Turks, 
Americans, and various European powers.  The PUK, meanwhile, has 
maintained relatively close ties to Iran and some connections with the Syrian 
Kurds.  The close business ties between the KRG and Turkey bely 
Fukuyama’s argument that social capital can be an important factor in inter-
state economics.  While Turkey has fractious relations with its own Kurdish 
population and many other groups of Kurds in surrounding nations, the KRG 
has maintained a positive relationship with Turkey that has translated to 
increased trade even as the Turks repress Kurds domestically.  
 The KRG continues to have political power based on traditional 
support, patronage, and tribal affiliation; however, the PUK and Change List 
are both assemblages of diverse coalitions that have coalesced around two 
main organizations.  As Minkoff contends, this is important because it allows 
for an otherwise diffuse opposition to unite in an effort to register their 
opinions, build social capital, and amplify capacity.  
2.11 Not a Social Movement Per Se, but An Interesting Case Study 
As previously discussed, research for this thesis revealed that the Iraqi 
Kurdish push for political self-governance has not been a social movement 
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per se.  While the KDP and PUK organizations extended beyond just political 
actions, they eventually coalesced to form the Kurdish Regional Government.  
They operated as armed political parties; however, they were also voluntary, 
self-generating organizations that were autonomous from the Iraqi 
government when they were revolting against Baghdad.  They were thus, 
arguably, key components of Kurdish civil society.  Members of each 
organization enjoyed large amounts of bonding social capital, and the KDP 
and PUK also have demonstrated their capacity for bridging social capital 
whenever they band together to accomplish a greater task. This was 
demonstrated when launched coordinated rebellions against Saddam Hussein 
in 1983, 1991, and 2003. 
The KDP and PUK are encompassed by Habermas’ conception of civil 
society as organizations that observe and listen to the desires of their 
constituents and then transmit them.  At times they did this via political 
negotiations with Baghdad, but they also resorted to violence in the face of 
authoritarian pressure.  Nevertheless, both groups remained committed to 
democratic self-governance, though the definition of this ranged from limited 
local autonomy to full independence, depending on the time and social 
climate.  Both organizations were engaged in collective action, and they both 
acted according to their own conceptions of the public good. 
One major complaint of the KDP, however, is the fact that it has a 
hierarchical structure that puts the Barzani patriarch at the top of the 
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organization.  The PUK has more flexibility, but it is still a hierarchical 
organization that places those at the top in charge of all policy decisions.  
This form of administration does little to inculcate political skills, especially 
as many of the leaders from both organizations are members of the Kurdish 
elite, either by tribal affiliation or by education.  Thus, Fung’s observations of 
movements becoming schools for democracy does not neatly apply in this case 
study. 
Curiously, the PUK was initially founded in part because of 
unwillingness of Mustafa and Masoud Barzani to more aggressively push for 
Kurdish independence.  Since the two parties formed a coalition government 
in 2004, both organizations have been at times leery of the move for 
independence.  Perhaps this is because the party elites recognize the power 
that they enjoy both in Baghdad and in the KRG, but they have recently 
started discussing independence as a result of renewed grassroots pressure 
and the political opportunities created by the security issues that plague 
Iraq. 
The KRG as a whole recognizes that it must calculate the Turkish 
government into any independence bid.  While the Kurds and Turks have had 
fractious relations, the KRG and Turkey enjoy relatively good political and 
economic relations, as discussed previously.  These connections might have 
had a radical-flank effect on the PUK, as it is no longer as aggressively 
supportive of the Syrian and Turkish Kurdish movements. As Walzer 
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describes, however, political autonomy has made the KDP and PUK, the 
strongest two actors in the KRG, even stronger rather than distributing 
power more equally.  The KRG, however, is no longer a two party state or a 
political duality.  This demonstrates the openness of the KRG to accede to 
internal social pressures and change in a democratic way rather than 
through the authoritarianism that the Barzanis often employed. 
As internal political divisions have largely been put aside in the face of 
the existential threat that is the current insurgency, the KRG has been able 
to treat with the United States, Turkey, and Iran in a series of pragmatic 
diplomatic efforts.  Although all three nations have at some point worked to 
suppress elements of the KDP and PUK, they still have been able to utilize 
their historical connections and social capital to engage diverse regional and 
international powers as they fight insurgents and solidify their gains.   
With current instability in the Kurdish regions of Turkey, the Turkish 
government might be willing to support an Iraqi Kurdistan as a way to 
counterbalance the PKK.  While Iran and the United States both seem to 
desire Iraq’s borders to remain as they are, an independent Kurdistan could 
improve regional stability as they have ties with partners throughout the 
region and have been a firm opponent to terrorism, launching effective 
military and intelligence operations. 
  Although not a traditional social movement, the movement for an 
independent Kurdistan has created a relatively united coalition of interests.  
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The Barzani clan and its allies might dominate the KDP, but the PUK 
continues to represents a number of political ideologies, including social-
democrats, free market capitalists, and progressives.  Further, the two 
groups, and the KRG in general, are representative of Kurds from both rural 
communities and the cities.  In addition, the KRG has reserved 10% of 
parliamentary seats for ethnic minorities, namely Turkmens and Assyrians.  
They have attempted to make a government that is representative of all 
people living within the KRG, from communists to Islamic fundamentalists. 
Maintaining this pluralist society and continuing to promote social capital 
between groups will be important should the Kurds in Iraq finally achieve 
the century long struggle for an independent Kurdistan. 
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3.0 Concluding Thoughts 
 These two case studies demonstrate that ethnic minority groups that 
have been historically excluded from the political process can achieve some 
form of democratic self-governance by creating social movements and similar 
organizational forms.  The Zapatista movement and the EZLN began their 
campaign for autonomy and political freedoms with an offensive military 
campaign; however, the leadership quickly endorsed a political solution when 
international outrage forced the Mexican military to cease its harsh 
crackdown.  The Zapatistas actively engaged not with foreign governments, 
but with INGOs and grassroots supporters.  This gave them both the media 
attention that forced the Mexican government into political negotiations and 
the resources the EZLN requires to continue administering its parallel 
system of autonomous government.   
Alternatively, the Kurds in Iraq have focused on engaging in a series of 
military offensives and gathering international political support from a 
diverse coalition of partners.  While not a traditional social movement, the 
Iraqi Kurds have demonstrated many of the hallmarks that researchers look 
for in such a movement.  Despite historical animosity, the KRG has engaged 
with Turkey and created a number of bilateral trade agreements that allow 
the autonomous region to sell its oil while importing finished goods and 
securing infrastructure investments.   
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At the same time, the Iraqi Kurds have maintained relations with 
Iran, a nation that expelled Mustafa Barzani and his followers only to 
provide him and his son with weapons and supplies in their fights with 
Baghdad.  Despite military stalemates and losses, the Kurds continued to 
push for greater autonomy and self-governance.  While they secured some 
concessions from Baghdad under both Qasim and Hussein, the KDP and 
PUK frequently fought for greater rights and freedoms.  Although the KDP 
has at times been slow to aggressively push for more than autonomy and the 
Barzanis have frequently sought to consolidate their own power at the 
expense of political rivals, they have remained committed to Kurdish freedom 
for over 70 years, since the formation of the Republic of Mahabad in 1946. 
Another difference has been how each movement has framed itself.  
The EZLN contends that both its leadership and its followers are primarily 
poor indigenous subsistence farmers.  They position themselves not as the 
defenders of all of Mexico’s indigenous, but as a local movement that has 
stood in solidarity with other groups suffering the same indignities.  The 
Zapatistas have always contended that both their fight and their goals are 
local to Chiapas.  This might have constrained their geographical 
effectiveness to a single state, but the EZLN was able to build and maintain 
their coalition of support even when their leadership was under siege in the 
Lacandon Jungle.  At the same time, the EZLN has emerged from Chiapas to 
gain additional support and broadcast its ideology to sympathetic audiences.  
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In the 2005 La otra campaña (The Other Campaign), Subcomandante Marcos 
traveled around Mexico and presented the EZLN’s anti-neoliberal ideology 
and proposals to include constitutional protections and rights for the 
indigenous to various scholars, unions, and political parties (Marcos, 2006).   
The self-reported reason for this campaign was to force the federal 
government to include the protections for indigenous Mexicans that they had 
agreed to in the San Andres Accords a decade previous while also seeking to 
eliminate the neoliberal trade policies, like NAFTA, that the EZLN had long 
campaigned against.  At the same time, this tour also gave the Zapatista 
movement increased exposure in areas where their framing of the EZLN was 
likely facing significant pushback from the federal government.  This allowed 
the Zapatistas to add new partners and increase their bridging social capital 
with a wider audience. 
Further, the Zapatista movement spent years formalizing support and 
forging agreements among distinct indigenous groups and within the local 
mestizo population.  Utilizing both pre-existing indigenous political 
structures and the structure that the Liberation Theology of the Catholic 
Church had already constructed, the EZLN has been able to create and 
maintain both bonding and bridging social capital throughout all stages of 
the movement’s history.  The movement’s partnerships of both local and 
international collaborators has created strong social capital bonds that they 
can rely on for both material and political support.   
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The Zapatista movement has shown little progress towards the de jure 
autonomy they have sought for over twenty years.  While attacks from right-
wing paramilitary groups have declined, infrequent strikes on EZLN 
members and supporters still occur without government investigation or 
repercussion.  It seems unlikely that the Zapatista movement will move 
beyond its current territorial holdings, and there is a risk that support will 
decline as longtime international allies and supporters age. The movement 
continues to invite young activists from Mexico and around the world to 
observe and participate in the movement, potentially mitigating this, 
however.  Nevertheless, internal support has not translated to increased 
recognition or further political engagement. 
Meanwhile, the KRG has made strides towards independence since 
securing near-total autonomy through the Iraqi constitution.  With their 
international allies and contacts, the Kurds in Iraq have forged political 
support that would likely translate into immediate and widespread 
recognition of statehood.   
While Masoud Barzani and other Kurdish officials might privately 
wish to remain an autonomous federal state within Iraq, they KDP and PUK 
have both demonstrated that they are responsive to the desires of the 
populace.  With a powerful opposition party in the KRG parliament, Barzani 
and his allies are unlikely to oppose independence for fear of losing popular 
support.  With the promise of a referendum for independence in 2016, the 
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KRG has only months to ensure a peaceful transition out of Iraq should the 
populace support such a move.  This is arguably the best time for such a 
transition as the Kurds enjoy wide and enthusiastic support from the 
international community.  Further, the Iraqi government is in a relatively 
week position to block a Kurdish exit.   
The Iraqi military and the Shiite militias are focused on defeating 
Daesh and other insurgent groups, and they lack the manpower or political 
clout to attempt to force the Kurds to remain a part of Iraq.  Alternatively, 
the Kurds could come under international pressure to remain part of Iraq for 
some of these same reasons.  Should a referendum for independence pass, the 
already weak government of Abadi could be further undermined and invite 
additional instability.   Nevertheless, it seems likely that, should the 
referendum for independence pass, there will be a sovereign Kurdish state for 
the first time since the short-lived Republic of Mahabad. 
The main difference between these two cases is the commitment to 
ideology.  The Zapatistas and the Iraqi Kurds are pursuing democratic 
reforms that will lead to either total political autonomy or independence, but 
their strategies for securing support is markedly different.  The EZLN has a 
set ideology that prospective partners must agree to at least accept, if not 
operate under.  The Iraqi Kurds, especially the KRG, are ideologically flexible 
and are often willing to change priorities if it means increased support and 
political patronage, from disavowing the PKK to shedding far left ideology.   
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3.1 Future Work: An Examination of the Syrian Kurds 
As it becomes increasingly likely that the Iraqi Kurds will have an 
independent nation in a matter of years, another group of Kurds has started 
a campaign for autonomy.  The Democratic Union Party (PYD), and its 
People’s Protection Units (YPG), is currently engaged in a struggle against 
Daesh, al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN), and various other Islamist 
factions in Syria.  This case presents an interesting parallel to both the 
Zapatista movement and to the KRG.  With a similar radical democratic 
ideology as the EZLN, the PYD has installed local councils composed of both 
Arabs and Kurds whenever they take new territory.  They then promote local 
self-governance much like the EZLN (International Crisis Group, 2014).   
Furthermore, the Syrian Kurds have publicly stated on numerous 
occasions that they only desire autonomy from Damascus.  There has been no 
talk of independence, though this might be for pragmatic reasons as the 
Assad regime has repeatedly declared that their only conception of victory is 
a reunified Syria (Black and Shaheen, 2016).  Still, the regime will likely be 
forced to accept an autonomous Kurdish region in the north should it survive 
the Syrian Civil War.  While the YPG have taken many loses, they have 
become an effective fighting force and are relatively well armed.   
Like the KRG, the PYD has sought to engage with numerous nations 
in a pragmatic manner.  While this engagement comes primarily as a way for 
nations like the United States to combat Daesh, the Syrian Kurds are gaining 
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numerous political allies and cultivating considerable social capital.  The 
PYD has engaged numerous nations, often appearing to play both sides 
(Shamsulddin, 2015).  While the US arms and provides the YPG with close 
air support against Daesh, they have also allied themselves with Russia, who 
provides these same services against rebel groups that the US is unwilling to 
strike.   
Thus, the YPG has been able to make territorial gains across the 
Kurdish cantons of Syria.  Indeed, the YPG only needs to conquer a few more 
towns and cities (certainly not an easy feat) before they connect the eastern 
cantons to the currently isolated Afrin.  Once this happens, the Syrian Kurds 
will hold virtually the entire Syrian/Turkish border.  While the Syrian regime 
is in no position to block such territorial expansion, Assad does maintain a 
truce with the PYD and nominally recognizes their political authority.  This 
acceptance of an armed Kurdish actor follows decades of political and ethnic 
repression from both Bashar and his father Hafez, including Arabization 
programs similar to those instituted by Saddam Hussein in Kirkuk and 
Mosul (Human Rights Watch, 1996). 
One major impediment to even an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria 
is Turkey.  Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have 
taken a hardline stance against the Syrian Kurds, a group he sees as an 
extension of the Turkish PKK.  While not entirely inaccurate, the PYD has 
worked recently to distance itself from the PKK.  Nevertheless, Turkey 
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continues to shell Kurdish positions in Syria, despite the YPG’s struggle 
against Daesh (Uras, 2016).   
While the United States, Russia, and much of Europe support the 
PYD, it is unknown whether they will protect the region from Turkish 
aggression once the civil war concludes.  At the moment, the AKP can only 
attack via artillery and machine gun fire as the Russians have publicly stated 
they will shoot down any Turkish military planes that violate Syrian 
airspace.  For the moment, these assurances serve to protect the PYD as its 
YPG units advance. 
Should the PYD be able to finish connecting the Kurdish cantons, they 
will be in a powerful position when the war concludes.  Not only have they 
politically engaged with local populations that they liberate from Daesh and 
JaN, the YPG has also organized a collective military force that includes 
ethnic Arabs and minorities from the lands they administer.  This 
organization is known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and includes 
numerous militias composed of Arab, Assyrian, and Turkmen fighters.  The 
bonds being formed in this umbrella military organization, and its recently 
established political wing called the Syrian Democratic Assembly, could prove 
to be a decisive factor in the PYD’s ambition for an autonomous state.  
Because many of these minority groups have large populations throughout 
the Kurdish lands in northern Syria, any political arrangement must include 
all of them to succeed.   
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The potential autonomous Kurdish state in Syria would be an ideal 
future case study as it represents a hybrid of the EZLN and KRG cases 
examined in this thesis.  The PYD has many of the social movement 
hallmarks that typified the Zapatista case study, but it also includes many of 
the ethnic and military components that have dominated the Iraqi Kurdish 
push for independence.  The PYD claims that they only seek autonomy, like 
the Zapatistas, but they are also establishing a majority Kurdish state like 
the KDP and PUK accomplished.   
Like in Chiapas, the PYD is establishing local councils to govern from 
the bottom, but they are also engaging with as many international 
governments as possible, a technique they might well have learned from the 
KRG.  The Syrian Civil War is far from concluded, and it is possible that the 
situation could change dramatically; however, the potential pluralist, 
autonomous Kurdish state could become an exciting and useful case study in 
the examination of how ethnic minority and politically marginalized groups 
gain self-governance in the face of authoritarian rule.  Like the KRG case 
study, this examination of the PYD would likely conclude that this Kurdish 
movement cannot neatly fit the mold of a social movement, but again, many 
social movement trends will likely be revealed while also illuminating the 
importance of both bonding and bridging social capital.    
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